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Capital Gain and the Sale
of a Business Opportunity:
The Income Tax Treatment of
Contract Termination Payments
The various circuit courts presently have no uniform
approach in determining the federal income tax treatment to be accorded the profits and losses arising from
the premature termination and disposition of business
contract arrangements.In an effort to find a consistent
approach to the problem, Professor Chirelstein compares
the old and new contract termination cases, reviews the
important recent cases dealing with contract terminations and the various approachesand trends established
therein, and analyzes the problem in light of the elements
considered relevant in the resolution of particularcases.
The author is critical of the Commissioner's efforts to
reach an ordinary income result in these cases by manipulating the confusing concepts of "property" and "future
income." He concludes that the real question is whether
income from the sale of business property is to be treated
as essentially different from other types of investment
profits for the purpose of the capital gains tax, and suggests that a forthright answer to this question, rather
than continued debate over the nature of qualifying
property, is most likely to produce consistency as respects the tax treatment of contract termination transactions.

Marvin A. Chirelstein*
The federal courts of appeals have given considerable attention
during the past few years to the question whether income arising
from the termination or cancellation of a business contract qualifies as gain from the sale of a capital asset. The recent decisions -

United States v. Dresser Industries, Inc.1 in the Fifth Circuit,
*Professor of Law, Rutgers University.
1. 824 Fed 56 (5th Cir. 1963).

2

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1

Commissionerv. Ferrer2 in the Second, and Wiseman v. Halliburton
Oil Well Cementing Co.' in the Tenth, among others - are worth
examining not only because they involve a recurring problem of
capital asset classification on which the circuit courts themselves
are now divided, but also because they seem to raise, uniquely,
and within the framework of a single though highly variable fact
situation, a number of major unresolved interpretative issues relating to the general application of capital gain. The courts appear
to have experienced more than the usual difficulty in determining
whether the elements of a "true" capital gain were present or
lacking in these contract termination cases. Thus, Judge Friendly
begins his opinion in Ferrerby remarking that "The difficulties
Mr. Ferrer must have had in fitting himself into the shape of the
artist [Toulouse-Lautrec in Moulin Rouge] can hardly have been
greater than ours in determining whether the transaction here at
issue fits the rubric 'gain from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset held for more than 6 months' . . . or constitutes ordinary income, as the Commissioner contends."4 Why such an awkward
fit? The answer, if one can be found, may serve to illuminate or at
any rate underscore some ambiguities of definition which at present complicate the administration of the capital gains tax.
The discussion that follows is divided into three parts: part I
contains a brief description of applicable interpretative principles,
contrasts the recent with the older contract termination cases,
and summarizes what appears to be the Commissioner's approach
in this area; part II reviews some of the significant contract termination cases decided since 1960; and part III attempts an analysis
of the contract termination problem in the light of the interpretative guides previously described.

I. THE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO CONTRACT
TERMINATION CASES
It would seem reasonable to suppose, at this advanced point in
our experience, that the principles of capital asset classification
would be fairly well defined. In fact, as everyone knows, the elements of uncertainty surrounding the scope of the preference
have shown a tendency to multiply rather than dwindle with the
passage of time. The statute is immediately to blame: section 12915
defines the term "capital asset" as "property," not including property falling within five excepted categories, but it otherwise pro2. 804 F.ed 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
3. 801 Fed 654 (10th Cir. 1962).
4. 304 F.2d at 126.
5. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 1221. [AM statutory references are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
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vides no guidelines for determining whether an economic interest
disposed of by a taxpayer qualifies for preference or not. The
Supreme Court has continuously rejected the possibility of resolving interpretative problems under the statute by applying its
definitional language in such a literal fashion as to render any
economic interest a capital asset for tax purposes which rises to
the dignity of "property" under local law rules and is not within
one of the specific statutory exceptions.0 Instead, the Court has
insisted that the capital asset definition "must be narrowly applied
and its exclusions interpreted broadly" in order to serve the "basic
congressional purpose." 7 Although this approach sensibly reflects
a desire to confine the scope of the capital gain preference in
accordance with the presumption that Congress must have intended it to have limited effect, it creates a remarkable void as
respects the content of the preference, since Congress has never
adequately expressed its "basic . . . purpose" in establishing a

system favorable to investment gain, but instead has largely left
the matter to surmise.
The Court itself, however, besides rejecting a mechanistic interpretation of the statute and adopting the famous canon of construction quoted above, has made an effort over the years to fill
the void by developing an affirmative "view" of the capital gains
tax and by advancing certain criteria thought to be capable of
application in resolving problems of capital asset classification.
The Court's general view, which seems now to have acquired a
settled form of expression," emerges from a handful of widely
spaced capital gains opinions, beginning with Burnet v. Harmel
and going on through Hort v. Commissioner,o Corn ProductsRef.

Co. v. Commissioner," Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc.," and
most recently, Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, Inc.'
These opinions embody (a) an assumption concerning the aim of
6. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
7. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 59 (1955).
8. See Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134
(1960).
9. 287 U.S. 103 (1939) (bonus received on execution of an oil lease was
ordinary income).
10. 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (payment to lessor for cancellation of unexpired
portion of lease held ordinary).
11. 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (gains from sales of corn futures purchased by a
corn processing company as insurance against price rises were ordinary income).
12. 356 U.S. 260 (1958) (amount received on sale of oil payment by owner
of larger interest in the same property held ordinary).
13. 364 U.S. 130 (1960) (damages received for government's temporary
seizure of taxpayer's transport facilities held ordinary).
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Congress in enacting the capital gains tax, and (b) a two-fold
limitation on the scope of the capital asset definition.
The assumption, which rests upon nothing more than a scrap
or two of legislative history, is that Congress intended capital gain
treatment as a means of relieving against the hardship of taxing

previously accrued property appreciation all in one year.' 4 In
Burnet v. Harmel the Court explained that prior to 1921
gains realized from the sale of property were taxed at the same rates
as other income, with the result that capital gains, often accruing over
long periods of time, were taxed in the year of realization at the high
rates resulting from their inclusion in the higher surtax brackets. The
provisions of the 1921 revenue act for taxing capital gains at a lower
rate ... were adopted to relieve the taxpayer from these excessive tax
burdens on gains resulting from a conversion of capital investments, and
to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on such conversions.' 5

The same thought was echoed much later in Gillette Motor Transport, the Court there stating that "the purpose of Congress [is] to
afford capital-gains treatment only in situations typically involving the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time, and thus to ameliorate the hardship of
taxation of the entire gain in one year.""' Burnet v. Harmel was
decided in 1932; Gillette Motor Transport in 1960. It is con-

ceivable that by the later date Congress's objective in continuing
the lower rate for capital gains had changed in favor of such
considerations as the furnishing of investment incentives and the
removal of impediments to capital mobility, and that the purpose
of relieving against the hardship of income bunching had somewhat receded as a policy aim.' 7 At any rate, it is apparent that
14. H.R. REP. No. 850, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921); 1939-1 Cumt.
BuL. (pt. 2) 168, 176.
15. 287 U.S. at 106.
16. 864 U.S. at 134.
17. The Revenue Bill of 1963, as passed by the House, would have increased to 60% the deduction for gains from the sale of capital assets held for
more than two years, and would have reduced the alternative tax on such gains
to a maximum 21%. H.R. 8363, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. J 219(a) (1963). In explanation of this "reform" the committee report states:
Your committee has decreased the inclusion factor in the case of capital
assets held over 2 years in part to correspond with the rate reduction
provided for individuals generally. Probably more important, however,
has been your committee's desire to "unlock" capital investments where
the investor is willing to undertake new and riskier investments needed
by the economy but finds it unprofitable because of the substantial tax
liability he incurs at the time of the sale of his present holdings. It is
estimated that this unlocking effect will stimulate the realization of
capital gains to such an extent that in the first year revenues from this
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the Court's assumption with respect to the congressional purpose
has rarely if ever been used directly and by itself as a means of
distinguishing capital gain from ordinary income. Thus, the courts
have not extended this assumption to the point of denying capital
gain where a taxpayer sells property under an arrangement calling
for periodic annual purchase payments,'s nor has the Code, with a
six-month holding period requirement and an installment sale election, been especially consistent with a bunched income rationale.
Taken in context, the Court's description of congressional purpose in Burnet v. Harmel and Gillette Motor Transport can probably best be understood as a means of providing a framework for
the simple and fundamental conception that capital gain treatment is to be restricted to situations involving realized value
appreciation.The point is perhaps too obvious to require explanation, but it nevertheless lies at the heart of the time-honored fruitand-tree conundrum and is also a way of characterizing certain
other common problems of classification, such as the problem of
distinguishing between noncompete agreements and sales of good
will.' 9 In any event, of the five major capital gain cases mentioned
above, all but Corn Products were ultimately decided on the
ground that the exchange in question did not involve a realization
of gain traceable to an increment in the market value of the taxpayer's property. The Court's emphasis on property appreciation,
therefore, seems to call for a determination in every case that what
is paid for is value increment and not something else. In most cases
the determination can be made quite casually; in a few, the matter
is not so clear.
This stress on realized value appreciation as the only proper
object of preferred treatment also relates in different ways to the
two important rules of limitation developed by the Court in restricting the application of capital gain. The first such rule is
derived from the assignment-of-income cases and expresses the
source will increase by $450 million even though a smaller percentage of
all capital gains is taken into account for tax purposes. This larger
turnover of capital assets should result in increased investments and
will be particularly helpful in tapping new sources of risk capital.
H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 96 (1968). The provision, belatedly
opposed by the Treasury, was rejected by the Senate.
18. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942);
Estate of Raymond T. Marshall, 20 T.C. 979 (1953).
19. E.g., Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959); Aaron
Michaels, 19 T.C. 17 (1949). In Pines, Federal Income Taxation of Intangible
Assets, 8 TAx L. REV. 231, 237 (1953), the argument is made that the distinction between covenants not to compete and goodwill is illusory since the "net
effect is a reallocation of future incomes between buyer and seller, whether
there is a 'separable' covenant, an inseparable one, or no covenant at all."
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familiar idea that capital gain treatment does not extend to
amounts which merely represent a lump-sum "substitute" for
future ordinary incomeo2 0 The Ninth Circuit has recently stated
the principle in standard terms as follows:
It is well settled that a right to receive future income which is commuted into a lump sum payment results in ordinary income just as the
income if actually received in the future in several payments would
be ordinary income. The nature of the right to receive future income
as ordinary income does not change into capital gain by the mere
receipt of a lump sum in lieu of such future payments.21

In effect, a prepayment of rent, interest, wages or the like, though
it results in income bunching, is ineligible for preference.
But this future income limitation, however well settled, is subject to at least one major ambiguity: whether the denial of capital
gain applies merely to prepaid income transactions, which may
after all amount to little more than the financing or discounting
of receivables; or whether, on the other hand, the rule also affects
some situations in which the interest disposed of, although a right
to future ordinary income, is also the taxpayer's entire interest in
the property. In the latter situations, the property sold seems to
reflect an admixture of fruit and tree, with the result that the
factor of income prepayment is somewhat less apparent." The
Court's decision in the Hort case and its broad language in Lake,
as well as some lower court decisions, suggest that the future income rule extends to both types of situations, but as will be seen
the matter is still very much in doubt.
The second of the Court's rules of limitation - now as
familiar as the first - derives from the Corn Productsdecision. It
is, briefly, that the capital gain preference does not apply to profits
and losses "arising from the everyday operation of a business"
even though these everyday dealings involve property which is
not stock in trade in the usual sense and which, in addition, is of
20. Denying capital gain treatment to the sale of an oil payment the Court
in the Lake case said: "The substance of what was assigned was the right to
receive future income. The substance of what was received was the present
value of income which the recipient would otherwise obtain in the future. In
short, consideration was paid for the right to receive future income, not for an
increase in the value of the income-producing property." 856 U.S. at 266.
21. Holt v. Commissioner, 808 F.2d 687, 690-91 (9th Cir. 1962).
-2. ALI, DEFnTIONAL PROBLEMS In CAPiTAI GAms TAXATION 169-306
(Discussion Draft 1960). See generally Lyon and Eustice, Assignment of In-

come: Fruitand Tree as Irrigatedby the P. G. Lake Case, 17 TAx L. REV. 295
(1962); Note, 49 IowA L. REV. 89 (1963); Note, 69 YAlm LJ. 693 (1964); Commnent, The P. G. Lake Guides to Ordinary Income: An Appraisal in Light of
CapitalGains Policies, 14 STnw. L. Rzv. 551 (1962).
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a type that is usually identified with investment rather than business activity.2 3 Thus, gain or loss on a sale of corporate securities
may be ordinary if the securities have quasi-inventory status as
in Corn Productsor if they are acquired as part of a tie-in inventory purchaseP4 or represent a current expense of carrying on the
taxpayer's business. 25 The factor of value appreciation is here
insufficient to produce capital gain in view of its everyday business
source. CornProductsthus seeks to distinguish regular business income from investment gain by resorting to the context in which
the income arises and by examining the function in that context
of the property sold. A factual determination is then required as
to what role the particular property plays in the taxpayer's business and perhaps as to the taxpayer's motive in acquiring the
property.
Over and above the difficulties that this determination may
present in a given case, there is a serious uncertainty as to how
far the "everyday business" rule extends. Thus, what kinds of
profits and losses are to be regarded as arising from the "normal"
operation of a business or profession? Does Corn Products apply
only to property having quasi-inventory or quasi-business expense
status, or does it broadly extend to the income of a business enterprise from whatever business source derived?2 6 This issue partly
concerns the relationship of the Corn Productsdoctrine to section
1231 of the Code, which specifically affords capital gain treatment
to sales of real or depreciable property used in the trade or business.2 7 It also partly concerns the peculiar status of business
intangibles, which, if nondepreciable, do not qualify for capital
gain treatment under section 1231, but on the other hand generally lack the character of stock in trade.
These interpretative issues - those relating to the scope of the
Supreme Court's future income limitation, as well as those arising
under the Corn Products decision - all seem in a measure to be
present in the contract termination cases mentioned at the outset.
Thus, typically in this situation, the contract disposed of is one
which the taxpayer has entered into in the regular course of his
23. 350 U.S. at 52; see Surrey, Definitional Problem in Capital Gains
Taxation, 69 HAnv. L. REv. 985 (1956).
24. Western Wine &Liquor Co., 18 T.C. 1090 (1952); Rev. Rul. 40, 1958-1
Cum. BuL. 275.
25. Commissioner v. Bagley &Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955).
26. See Freeman, la There a New Concept of a Business Asset? 36 TAxEs
110 (1958).
27. Rev. Rul. 77, 1958-1 Cuim. BuL. 118. Compare E. I. du Pont de
Nemours &Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Ralph H. Peters,
87 T.C. 799 (1962).
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business or professional activities and represents a claim to future
income based upon a commitment to buy or sell goods or services
over a period of years. The length of term of the commitment necessarily varies. In some instances, the agreement is simply one and
perhaps only a minor feature of the taxpayer's commercial life,
and the commitment is limited to a stated number of years or is
measured by the expected useful life of a specific asset such as a
patent. In others, the agreement is the foundation upon which the
taxpayer's business or profession is built so that the term of the
commitment is indefinite or spans the anticipated life of the entire
enterprise. At some point during the course of the agreement, the
taxpayer is invited, either by the other contracting party or by a
third person, to surrender or convey his contract rights, and is
offered a cash consideration for his claim to the future contract
benefits. This consideration is usually a lump sum, but it sometimes takes the form of a percentage or royalty payment arrangement. The question, when he accepts, is whether the amount
received by the taxpayer for surrendering his contract rights shall
be treated as ordinary income or as payment in exchange for a
capital asset. There is present here the commutation of future
income factor; present also, though usually given less attention
by the opinion writers, is the factor of business dealings, whether
or not of an "everyday" variety.
With respect to the question of capital gain or ordinary income, the older contract disposition cases could fairly readily be
grouped on the basis of the type of contract claim at issue. Leasehold interests and "encumbrances," 8 like life estates, 29 were
regarded as capital assets when disposed of by the lessee. Employment contracts 0 as well as management, franchise, exclusive
agency and exclusive output agreements8 ' - indeed, virtually any
28. See Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.Qd 752
(2d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 829 (1954); Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1952); Rev. Rul. 531, 1956-2 Cum. BumL. 983.
29. See Allen v. First Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1946);
McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (9d Cir. 1946); Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943).
S0. See Gordon v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1958); George K.
Gann, 41 B.T.A. 388 (1940); Thurlow E. McFall, 34 B.T.A. 108 (1936); Rev.
Rul. 301, 1958-1 CuM. BuLL. 23.
31. See Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958) (right to
purchase entire output of coal mine for ten years); Leh v. Commissioner, 260
F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1958) (supply contract to purchase specified quantity of
gasoline); Roscoe v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1954) (exclusive
management agreement); Commissioner v. Starr Bros., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.
1953) (release from exclusive sales agency); General Artists Corp. v. Commis-
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agreement that could be characterized, simply, as "an opportunity,
afforded by contract, to obtain periodic receipts of income, by
dealing with another . . . or by rendering services" 32 - were
usually regarded as noncapital. There were exceptions, 33 but in
the aggregate it appeared that a consensus had developed among
the courts of appeals. Thus, the Tenth Circuit, having held in
Jones v. Corbyn04 that the surrender of an exclusive life insurance
agency to the insurance company for a lump-sum payment produced capital gain, later substantially repudiated that decision
and indicated its accord with other circuits finding ordinary income on similar transactions.3 , And the Second Circuit, following
a period of hesitation, agreed that payments made to a lessee for
the cancellation of his lease result in capital gain. 6 As a consequence, the location of the dividing line between dispositions of
contract rights which qualify as capital assets and those that
do not seemed reasonably clear prior to the unsettlement in this
area occasioned by the new wave of appellate court decisions.
These newer cases appear to be shifting the dividing line in the
direction of a broader capital gain classification for contract rights,
although the trend is by no means uniform among the circuits.
The shift, if there is one, is on two fronts. First, some courts,
notably the Second and Fifth Circuits, seem more willing than in
the past to grant capital gain treatment in cases where the contract
right surrendered, although not a lease in the usual understanding,
can be assimilated to a lease in the sense that by it the taxpayer
has acquired a right to make periodic use of property belonging
sioner, 205 F.2d 360 (9d Cir. 1953) (exclusive right to serve as booking agency
for popular singer); Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. United States, 158 F. Supp.
138 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (agreement between two utilities to interchange surplus
power). The cases are reviewed in Bechly, Sale of a Contract- Capital Gain
or OrdinaryIncome, 35 TAXEs 759 (1957).
32. Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1962).
33. Principal examples are Commissioner v. Goff, 212 F.2d 875 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954), finding capital gain on termination of an
exclusive output agreement; and Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir.
1950), holding that payment for the surrender of an exclusive life insurance
agency produced capital gain. See also Elliot B. Smoak, 43 B.T.A. 907 (1941).
In Rev. Rul. 374, 1955-1 Cuar. BuIL. 370, the Service without discussion held
that the sale of an exclusive agency contract by one distributor to another
qualified for capital gain treatment.
34. Supra note 33.
35. Wiseman v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 301 F.2d 654 (10th
Cir. 1962).
36. Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752 (2d
Cir. 1954).
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to another.W Among the older cases, only Commissioner v. Goff,"
decided by the Third Circuit, appears to have alluded to the
"lease" characterization in a context other than that of the conventional relationship between landlord and tenant with respect
to real property. Second, there may be a tendency, again by the
Fifth Circuit, to find a capital gain element in the sale or termination of a personal service agreement such as a management
contract." Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has recently cited Jones v.
Corbyn, thought to have been interred by its creator, with approval.40 This is not to suggest that there has been a direct reconsideration of the rule that amounts received upon the cancellation
of an employment contract are ordinary income, but only that it
may be less difficult now than formerly to establish that the termination of the taxpayer's employment was accompanied by the
transfer of a property interest having capital asset characteristics
and usually designated as good will. In both types of cases, the
courts, or some of them, are exhibiting an increased readiness to
perceive some sort of present right to an asset-in-being which is
larger than, or is in addition to, a mere claim to future ordinary
business or employment income.
As noted, these recent cases are not unanimous in moving
toward a broader capital gain classification for contract dispositions. Rather, they appear to divide on the issue, with the division
being not only between the circuits themselves, but in one and
possibly two instances between different panels of the same court
87. See, e.g., United States v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 824 F.2d 56 (5th Cir.
1968); Commissioner v. Ferrer, 804 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
88. 2m F.2d 875 (Sd Cir.), cert. denied, 848 U.S. 829 (1954).
39. See Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 807 F.2d 897 (5th
Cir. 1962). See also George J. Aitken, 85 T.C. 227 (1960), in which the taxpayer, employed as a solicitor by a fire and casualty insurance agency, on his
retirement sold the agency certain file data, called "expirations," relating to
the terms and expiration dates of insurance policies he had sold. The Tax
Court, finding that the taxpayer possessed a property right in the accumulated file data, held that the receipt was capital gain as against the Commissioner's contention that the payment represented an accrued right to future
renewal commissions. Accord, Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.
1968). The Aitken decision, supra, is thus to the effect that an employee may
develop attributes of goodwill in the performance of his job, provided that the
goodwill element is reflected in a document or other separable property having
independent economic value and is not part of the consideration rendered the
employer in return for the payment of regular compensation, the latter apparently being an issue for determination under local law. See also Merle P.
Brooks, 36 T.C. 1128 (1961).
40. Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 89, at 900, n.3.
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as well." Furthermore, this disagreement is squarely over the
scope of the capital asset definition in section 1221. Thus, since
almost all of these cases involved a mutual cancellation of rights
and obligations between the original contracting parties, those
courts which ultimately arrived at an ordinary income result
might well have done so with a minimum of effort and analysis by
emphasizing the absence of a sale or exchange in the transaction.
The fact that none of the courts felt satisfied to rest its decision
on that ground, though each was urged to do so by the Commissioner, indicates that the courts do not regard the purely technical
requirements of sale or exchange, i.e., that a separately disposable
property interest survive the transaction, as an acceptable means
of resolving the capital gain issue in this class of case." Instead,
the courts all appear to be committed to the harder task of deciding whether the interest disposed of constitutes a capital asset.
Once the sale or exchange requirement is passed, however, the
courts are hard put to isolate the appropriate principles of classification. The Commissioner apparently regards the Supreme
Court's future income limitation as his strongest weapon in these
cases, and the courts in general seem ready to agree that the issue
is at least properly considered in those terms. Taking this approach, the Commissioner usually asserts two grounds for treating
contract termination payments as ordinary income. They are, first,
that a contract which involves nothing more than a contingent
right to make money is not a capital asset, and second, that an
amount paid for the termination of a contract under which the
taxpayer would otherwise have derived future ordinary income
is a mere substitute for that future income and retains the same
41. In addition to the admitted conflict in the Fifth Circuit-compare
Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962),
with the Fifth Circuit cases cited in notes 48 & 50 infra-there is difficulty in
reconciling the ordinary income feature of the Second Circuit's decision in
Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962), with the capital gain
result reached in Ayrton Metal Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 741 (9d Cir.
1969), 'both cases involving the termination of a right to cash payments. As
respects inter-circuit conflicts, see discussion in Part II hereof.
42. See, e.g., Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson, 320 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.
1963); Ferrer,supra note 41. Section 1941, added to the Code in 1954, provides
that payments received by a lessee for the cancellation of a lease or by a distributor for cancellation of a distributorship agreement shall be treated as
received upon a sale or exchange of the lease or agreement, but in the latter case
only if the distributor has made a substantial capital investment in the distributorship. The effect of this section is unclear, see Commissioner v. Pittston Co.,
952 F.2d 344, 348 (2d Cir. 1958), but in any event it deals only with the sale or
exchange requirement and has no application in determining whether the lease
or distributorship is a capital asset. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 444
(1954).
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character as the original." It is not clear whether these two
grounds differ in some important way, or whether the first ground
is simply a broader version of the second. A contract claim is
certainly "property" in the constitutional sense. This fact may
not be enough by itself to assure capital gain treatment, but, if
not, the failure of what is admittedly property to qualify as a
capital asset would generally have to be due to some circumstance
relating to its acquisition, use, disposition, etc. Presumably the
fatal circumstance, in the Commissioner's view, is to be found in
the substitution factor. Thus, payment for performance of the
contract and payment for relinquishment differ only as to time of
receipt, and this difference, whatever consequence it may have in
precipitating the taxpayer's liability for tax, is not one which the
Commissioner regards as capable of changing future ordinary
income into present capital gain.
In the broader alternative, it may be the Commissioner's position that a simple contract relationship representing nothing more
than an expectancy or set of expectancies is inherently lacking in
the property characteristics of a capital asset, so that amounts
derived from the disposition of such a contract necessarily become ordinary income. Here the emphasis would be upon the term
"property" as a minimum requirement of capital asset status,
though the term would then be intended not in any universal sense
but as if subject to an intrinsic limitation which effectively excludes some kinds of contract rights.
I. A DISCUSSION OF THE SIGNIFICANT
RECENT CASES
The recent cases involve various types of contracts, some previously considered by the courts, others novel. There continues to
be fairly general agreement that payments made to an employee
for the cancellation of a bare employment contract are ordinary
income" and that the cancellation of a lease results in capital
gain;"4 but outside of these familiar situations the decisions present
43. Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1962); Rev. Rul. 18, 1961-1 Cums. BULL. 5, 8; Rev. Rul. 301, 1958-1 Cimt.
BULL. 23; Bechly, supra note 31.
44. See Holt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962); Roscoe v.
Commissioner, 215 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1954). Compare Nelson Weaver Realty
Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 43.
45. See Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir.
1960). See also Fairmont Park Raceway v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 780 (7th
Cir. 1964). Compare Voloudakis v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1960)
(ordinary income, where lease "assigned" for periodic payments, assignor retaining right of re-entry on default).
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a somewhat confused picture and no longer lend themselves to a
classification scheme based wholly upon the subject matter of the
contract released. Instead, since the opinions in this area are
invariably concerned in one way or another with the presence or
absence of qualifying "property," it may be more useful, or at any
rate more interesting, to group the cases in terms of the approach
taken by the courts to what is apparently regarded by all as the
basic and decisive issue. Conceding that the same decision may
reflect more than a single reason for the result reached, the cases
can nevertheless by divided into three categories: first, those decisions in which the disposition of a contract right is treated simply
as an anticipation of future income, under a standard Hort-Lake
analysis;" second, at the opposite pole, those which openly or
impliedly reject the Hort-Lake approach and instead regard the
termination of a contract right as a sale of property qualifying for
capital gain; and third, those, largely in the Second Circuit, which
are decided under a rule of "substantiality" based upon an assumed distinction between simple contract claims and possessory
interests in the nature of a lease. The cases in each category, to
repeat, uniformly apply a concept of qualifying property, but with
differing results.
1. Standard Approach
Cases using the standard Hort-Lake analysis continue to emphasize the idea of equivalence, or substitution, as between present
and future contract receipts. In Holt v. Commissioner47 for example, the taxpayer, a motion picture producer, received a lumpsum payment from Paramount Pictures for the release of a
contract calling for the taxpayer to produce a stated number of
films over a period of years for a fee plus a percentage of the gross
receipts from each picture. Public interest in the type of film
produced by the taxpayer had suddenly declined. The Ninth
Circuit, predictably, found the receipt to be ordinary income on
the ground that the sum paid represented a substitute for amounts
which would have been compensation for personal services had
the parties simply carried out their original contract obligations.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hort was especially relied upon
for the proposition that a transaction which involves no more
than the receipt of the "present discounted value" of future earnings does not produce capital gain, even though the right to obtain
those earnings may constitute "property" in an abstract sense.
46. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); Commissioner v. P. G.
Lake, Inc., 856 U.S. 260 (1958).
47. 303 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
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As in Hort, the court thus viewed performance of the contract and
nonperformance as equivalent for tax purposes and had little difficulty in concluding that the termination payment was personal
service income.
The Fifth Circuit, in two cases involving management and
agency contracts, has also reached an ordinary income result by
application of the Hort-Lake future income limitation, though
another panel of the same court has taken an opposite view. In
United States v. Eidson," the taxpayers, individuals, had entered
into a 10-year contract to manage a mutual assessment insurance
company and to act as the company's exclusive agent. Their compensation was 40% of gross annual premiums less the expense of
operating the insurance company. The taxpayers subsequently
assigned the management and agency contract to another insurance company for a cash payment, the contract then having seven
years to run but subject to renewal. The court held the receipt
to be ordinary income as reflecting the cash value of what would
otherwise have been earned during the remaining term of the
contract, although the district court had found that the renewable agreement in effect represented the taxpayer's equity in the
non-stock insurance company. 9 Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson50 also involved the termination of an agency relationship, in
this instance the sale of a group of mortgage service contracts
under which the taxpayer, as agent for certain mortgage buyers,
undertook to service the mortgage accounts for a fee based upon
a percentage of the outstanding balance of each loan. Despite a
recent decision to the contrary in the same circuit, the court sustained the Commissioner in treating the amounts received on
assignment of the service contracts as a substitute for future
service fees taxable as ordinary income. The court conceded, however, that the taxpayer's files and records possessed independent
value as customers lists, and accordingly it remanded the case
for an allocation of the total purchase price between the right to
fees and the value of the taxpayer's good will.
Cases involving exclusive licenses for the use of patents and
copyrights are represented in each of the three categories designated above, with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Wiseman v.
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co." being the most traditional
48. 310 P.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1962).

49. Accord United States v. Woolsey, 396 F.2d

987 (5th Cir. 1963); Hyatt

v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1968), affirming 20 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1635 (1961); Joseph W. Brown, 40 T.C. 861 (1963). See also Paul Small
Artists, Ltd., 37 T.C. 223 (1961).
50. 820 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1963).
51. 301 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1962).
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in approach. The contract ultimately relinquished in Halliburton
Oil related to a patented process for the creation and stimulation
of oil and gas production. In 1949, Halliburton, the taxpayer,
obtained from the owner of the patent, Stanolind Oil and Gas
Company, an exclusive license to use and grant sublicenses for
use of the process. Four years later, partly as a result of Halliburton's research and development work, there was an unprecedented demand for the process which the taxpayer could not
fill, and after considering various alternatives, Halliburton agreed
to release to Stanolind its exclusive license and right to grant sublicenses in exchange for a nonexclusive license to use the process
without payment of royalties, plus an annual payment from
Stanolind equal to one-third of the royalties which the latter
should receive from any new licensees. In 1953, the taxpayer received more than $400,000 as its share of annual royalties and
sought to treat the amount as long-term capital gain.
Placing primary reliance on Hort and Lake, the Tenth Circuit
found ordinary income in this situation and held that "the royalty
received by Halliburton under the 1953 agreement was no more
than a substitute for future income which Halliburton would have
received from granting third party licenses, had it chosen to exercise that right ..... " The court dismissed the taxpayer's argument that the exclusive license constituted a substantial property
right by stating that since the basic patent remained the property
of the patent owner, the taxpayer's "rights were dependent entirely upon the contract."" It also stressed that as the taxpayer
had previously deducted its development costs as a current expense, its basis for the contract right was zero, and hence,
apparently, the payments received by it could not be treated as
a return of capital.
The cases in this standard Hort-Lake category, of which the
foregoing are merely representative, range fairly widely in subject
matter but have no noticeable unifying elements other than the
basic conception that a right to future income from a contract
relationship is not a capital asset. The opinions sometimes emphasize the factor of individual or corporate personal services when it
is present; in other instances the absence of a capital outlay is
stressed; and in still others, consistent with the theory that payment for the termination of a contract constitutes a "discounting"
of future receipts, importance has been given to the certainty or
probability that the income will materialize and to the predictability of the amounts anticipated. But these factors are not
52. Id. at 658.
58. Ibid.
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always present in the cases that are decided for the Commissioner,
and if present are not always stressed, so that by and large they
do not serve as "tests" or criteria and at all events cannot convincingly be used to distinguish the cases in this category from
those in the next.
2.

The New Wave

Judge Cameron's opinions in Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v.
Commissioner" and United States v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,"
particularly the latter, contain a forceful exposition of the view that
the Hort and Lake decisions, to the extent deemed applicable to
contract termination payments, have been misapplied. These cases
obviously stand in sharp contrast to the same circuit's decisions
in the Eidson and Bisbee-Baldwin cases and to the Tenth Circuit's decision in HalliburtonOil.
Nelson Weaver Realty, like Bisbee-Baldwin, involved the termination or assignment of a mortgage service contract. The taxpayer
had previously entered into a contract with New York Life Insurance Company whereby the realty company became the exclusive
mortgage sales and service agency for New York Life within a
specified territory. Having operated under the contract for eight
years and having accumulated some 1800 mortgage accounts, the
taxpayer, with New York Life's consent, sold its right to service
these accounts, together with all related files and records, to another service agency for a cash sum. The court held that the payment produced capital gain and rested its decision, in part at least,
on the ground that the service agreement represented a major
item in the taxpayer's capital structure to which was attributable
"more than half of its business operations over a period of years."
Although the gross service fees anticipated by the purchaser under
the contract were presumably ascertainable, the court found that
the amount paid for the service contract bore no inevitable discount relationship to the net income to be earned by the purchaser,
since the latter would be obliged to sustain the uncertain cost
of performing the services called for by the contract. On this
ground it distinguished the Lake case, in which the right to income
being sold was certain in net amount. In addition, or perhaps in
the alternative, the court stressed that the transaction involved
not only the mortgage service contract, but also files and records
having independent value as customers lists. A dissent argued,
54. 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962).
55. 324 F.ad 56 (5th Cir. 1968).
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on the basis of Williams v. McGowan," that the total purchase
price should have been "comminuted into its fragments" and allocated between the value of the right to receive service fees and
the value of the remaining property transferred, presumably the
files and records, with the amount allocated to the service contract to be treated as ordinary income on the ground that the
taxpayer to that extent "was simply converting future income
into present income." The dissenting view was in effect adopted
by a majority of the judges sitting in Bisbee-Baldwin.
The Dresser Industries case presented the same court with a
second opportunity to focus upon the scope and applicability of
the Hort-Lake future income limitation. As in Halliburton Oil,
the taxpayer in Dresser Industries had previously acquired an
exclusive license to practice a patented process belonging to another firm (though not a right to grant sublicenses) in exchange
for a percentage of the fees earned thereby. After a period of some
fifteen years, the taxpayer and the patentee entered into a new
arrangement under which the taxpayer agreed to release the exclusive feature of the original grant (retaining, however, a nonexclusive right to practice the patent) and accepted as consideration for such release the sum of $500,000 to be paid by the patentee
out of royalties earned from licensing third parties.
The court, again speaking through Judge Cameron, sustained
the taxpayer's treatment of amounts received under the later
agreement as capital gain, the Commissioner having argued for
ordinary treatment on the ground that these amounts represented
the anticipation of future ordinary income. Hort-Lake limitations,
insofar as they might be thought to apply to the sale of a contract
right as distinguished from other property such as land or securities, were frankly rejected, the court stating that the Lake case
should not be interpreted
to mean that any money paid which represents the present value of
future income to be earned is always taxed as ordinary gains. As a legal
or economic position, this cannot be so. The only commercial value of
any property is the present worth of future earnings or usefulness. If
the expectation of earnings of stock rises, the market value of the stock
may rise; at least a part of this increase in price is attributable to the
We conclude therefore, that the
expectation of increased income ....
sale was not merely the present sale of the right to earned income, to be
paid in the future. Taxpayer had an asset, a right, a property which
would produce income. The fact that the income which could be earned
would be ordinary income is immaterial; such would be true of the sale
of all income-producing property."
56. 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945) (on sale of going business each asset
treated separately so losses on stock in trade were ordinary).
57. 324 FRd at 59.
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Moreover, conceding that the purpose of the capital gain tax
might be to ameliorate tax burdens on gains accruing over a substantial period of time and realized in one particular year, the
court found that precisely that had occurred in the case at hand:
"What increased in this case, over those years, was the value of
the right 'exclusively' to practice the patent. When that right was
sold back to .

..

[the patentee], a capital gain occurred." 8 The

court also stated that it considered the release of the exclusivity
feature of the license as the cutting off of a "vertical slice" of the
taxpayer's rights, rather than, as in Lake, the carving out of a
short-term income interest from a larger estate: "The tree was
sold, along with the fruit, at least insofar as that branch was concerned.""
For good measure, a concurring opinion characterized the Commissioner's position as "bad economics" and "bad law."60
The Nelson Weaver Realty and Dresser Industries decisions
are uniquely forthright in their rejection of the Commissioner's
future income analysis, but there are other decisions which may
reflect a similar point of view. Among the older cases, as indicated
above, the Third Circuit's Goff decision 6 ' may be said to have
taken the same approach. More recently, the Second Circuit, in
Ayrton Metals Co. v. Commissioner0 2 found capital gain in connection with the relinquishment by the taxpayer, an ore broker, of
its right to participate in profits derived by another brokerage firm
from an exclusive dealing arrangement with the owner of a Bolivian
antimony mine. The taxpayer had initially exchanged its participation right for a "commission" based on future profits on purchases of the ore, and then subsequently gave up its claim to the
commissions in exchange for a lump-sum payment. The court
characterized the initial exchange as a sale of a partnership
interest." By way of dictum, however, it stated that it would
generally regard a right to future income, taken by itself, as a
capital asset, provided that the amount of the future income was
uncertain and had not been earned or accrued at the time the taxpayer's interest was disposed of. This view, which may not be
entirely consistent with some portions of the same court's later
58. Id. at 61.
59. Id. at 58.

60. Id. at 61, 62.
61. 212 F.2d 875 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954.)
62. 299 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1962).
63. On the other hand, in United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.
1963), involving the sale of an insurance agency partnership, the court declined to view the sale of the several partners' interests as a circumstance apart
from the termination of the partnership's agency under section 741 of the
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6 4 is essentially in accord with
decision in Commissioner v. Ferrer,
that expressed in Dresser Industries. In substance it is, simply,
that the sale of a right to future income, not yet earned or accrued,
reflects the very image of a capital gain.

3.

Equitable Interest Standard

The Second Circuit's decision in Commissionerv. Ferrerseems
in a sense to lie midway between Halliburton Oil and Dresser
Industries; at any rate, it has been cited as a source of interpretative inspiration both by those courts that do, and by that court
which does not, consider the substituted income rule to be applicable to contract termination payments.
As a matter of incidental history, the Second Circuit prior to
Ferrerappeared to follow the pattern generally prevailing among
the courts, having found capital gain upon a lessee's surrender of
its lease to the lessor,8 5 but also having found ordinary income
upon the cancellation of an exclusive distributorship,6 6 the sale
of exclusive agency rights, 7 and the termination of an exclusive
right to buy the output of a coal mine. In the last of these decisions,
Commissioner v. Pittston Co.," the court held that the taxpayer's
contract right to acquire the mine output lacked the quality of a
"substantial" property interest for the reason, in part, that the
taxpayer's sole remedy would have been in damages had the
other contracting party elected to breach its contract obligation
by selling coal to third parties. In this respect, the court stated,
the taxpayer's status was different from that of a lessee whose
rights in the leased premises are enforceable in equity. No citation
to local law rules was offered in support of this conclusion; indeed,
a dissenting opinion, while disputing the basic relevance of the
substantiality test, expressed doubt as to whether the taxpayer's
relief actually would have been restricted to money damages under
the particular circumstances of the case. On the other hand, this
Code. Therefore, the termination payment was held to be ordinary income
under a standard Hort-Lake analysis. The same result was reached in Holt v.

Commissioner, 808 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962), under the Int. Rev. Code of 1989,
ch. 1, § 117, 53 Stat. 50 (pt. 1). Compare Hatch v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d
26 (9th Cir. 1952). In addition, or in the alternative, the court in Woolsey,
supra, held that the term "unrealized receivables" in section 751(a) & (c) of

the Code was broad enough to cover contract rights involving future income
not yet earned.
64. 804 F.2d 125 (ed Cir. 1962).
65. Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752 (2d

Cir. 1954).
66. Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc., 204 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1953).
67. General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1958).
68. 259 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1958).
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question of the remedy available seems to have been merely one
of several criteria applied by the majority in determining whether
the taxpayer's rights had substance, and it is not at all clear that
the court would have decided the case differently had the taxpayer
shown that it would have been entitled to equitable relief under
local law in the event of a breach by its promisor. The analogy to
lessee status, turning in the end upon the availability of equitable
relief, nevertheless becomes the principal point at issue in Ferrer.
As a consequence, the outcome of the Ferrercase has a somewhat
fortuitous quality, with the taxpayer apparently failing to achieve
full capital gain treatment solely by reason of an accident of legal
draftsmanship which might well have been averted by the parties
had anyone foreseen the court's position.
A rather detailed account of the background of Ferrer will be
helpful. In November, 1951, the actor Jose Ferrer entered into a
standard Dramatic Production Contract with Pierre LaMure for
the production of a play based upon LaMure's novel "Moulin
Rouge," a biography of Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec. By the contract, LaMure granted to Ferrer, in return for a percentage of the
weekly box-office receipts, the exclusive right to produce and present the play in the United States and Canada. In addition, Ferrer
acquired a 40% share in the motion picture, television and radio
rights, provided that the play was produced and presented within
a specified time limit. A week or two after signature of the contract, director-producer John Huston called Ferrer to inquire
whether he would be interested in playing the lead role in a motion
picture to be based on "Moulin Rouge." Ferrer replied affirmatively, but then advised Huston that he, Ferrer, was the owner, or
part-owner, of the motion picture rights and that if Huston desired
to acquire those rights he would have to negotiate with Ferrer. In
the negotiations that followed, Huston's attorney insisted on
"either an annulment or a conveyance" of the Dramatic Production Contract between Ferrer and LaMure. Ferrer tentatively
agreed and signed a letter prepared by LaMure's attorney under
which the contract between Ferrer and LaMure was "cancelled
and terminated in all respects." Ferrer withheld delivery of the
letter, however, pending completion of arrangements between
himself and Huston.
Ultimately, in May, 1952, Ferrer entered into a contract with
Huston's independent production company by which the latter
engaged Ferrer's services to play the Toulouse-Lautrec role. Ferrer
was to receive a stated salary, which worked out in the year in
question, 1953, to be about $110,000 and which Ferrer reported
as ordinary income. In addition, he was to receive "percentage
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compensation," a stated percentage of the net motion picture
distribution profits. Following signature of this agreement, Ferrer
delivered to LaMure the letter terminating their prior agreement;
LaMure then transferred the motion picture rights to Huston.
The motion picture, "Moulin Rouge," was successfully produced, and in 1953, in addition to his salary, Ferrer received nearly
$180,000 as percentage compensation. The issue in the case,
simply, was whether this latter amount should be taxed to Ferrer
as ordinary income or as capital gain.
The Commissioner argued in the Tax Court, and later on
appeal, that Ferrer's percentage compensation should be regarded
as nothing more than additional payment for personal services as
a motion picture actor. In reply, Ferrer was permitted to introduce
a letter from Huston's attorney, written almost a year after the
May contract signing, and likewise oral testimony by the same
person, to the effect that the percentage money had been paid for
the release of the Dramatic Production Contract and not as additional salary. The Tax Court fully credited this evidence and,
finding the contract to be a capital asset and its release to be a
sale or exchange, held that the entire amount of the percentage
compensation was long-term capital gain. 9
On appeal by the Commissioner, the circuit court declined to
reverse the Tax Court's findings on the personal service issue. It
did, however, reassess the character of the contract rights which
Ferrer had acquired and then released, by treating each as a separate economic interest in the basic copyright. It determined,
following a laborious dissection of the contract, that these rights
were essentially threefold: (1) the right to produce and present the
play, (2) the right to consent or refuse consent to any disposition
of the motion picture rights prior to the time that the play had
run for a specified period, and (3) the right to receive 40% of any
motion picture proceeds if the play was in fact produced. The
court then proceeded to examine the New York cases with a view
to determining whether, under state law, the taxpayer had obtained an interest in the copyright which could be said to resemble
that of a lessee in the sense that equitable relief would have been
available had his rights been the subject of interference. On this
basis it decided that right (1) was analogous to a lease and vested in
the taxpayer an equitable interest in the play; that right (2) resembled an "encumbrance" and created an equitable interest in
the motion picture rights; but that right (3), despite some case
authority suggesting the contrary, produced no "affirmative
equitable interest" whatever, being merely a right to receive "a
69. Jose V. Ferrer, 35 T.C. 617 (1961).
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as further income from the lease

of the play."o Accordingly, rights (1) and (2) were given capital
asset status and right (3) ordinary status, and the case was
remanded to the Tax Court for an allocation of the percentage
money among the several interests.
As respects rights (1) and (2), the court rejected the view that
these interests should be excluded from capital gain treatment
because receipts from the play, had it been produced, would have
been ordinary income. "The latter," said the court, "is equally
true if a lessee of real property sells or surrenders a lease from
which he is receiving business income or subrentals,"' yet the
courts are together in regarding a lease as a capital asset in the
hands of a lessee. As respects right (3), on the other hand, the
court likewise refused in effect to take the position that this interest qualified as a capital asset merely because it represented a right
to income not yet earned and uncertain in amount. The latter
right was compared to that of a lessee entitled to receive from
his lessor "a percentage of what the lessor obtained from other
tenants attracted to the building by the lessee's operations."72
Since such percentage payments would result in ordinary income,
a sale of the lessee's right thereto for a lump sum payment produced ordinary income as well. The court cited the Holt and Hort
decisions for this conclusion, though both apparently involved
the problem from a lessor's standpoint.
In brief, the "equitable interest" rule - of which the Second
Circuit seems so far to be the chief proponente' - is thus apparently intended to distinguish between situations in which a
contract confers upon the taxpayer a right to derive income by
making or preventing the disposition of specific property, and
situations in which the contract merely creates a right to share
in the proceeds of the disposition of property belonging to another. Carried out in terms of a "remedy" concept, it seems to
follow that if the taxpayer's interest is enforceable only by dam70. 304 F.2d at 133.
71. Id. at 132.
72. Id. at 134.
73. In Maryland Coal & Coke Co. v. McGinnes, 225 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Pa.
1964), the court found ordinary income on the termination of an exclusive
agency agreement entitling the taxpayer to sell all the coal from a mine for
the entire life of the mine at a stated commission. Citing Ferrer, the court
stated that the agency contract was not a capital asset for the reason that it
failed to confer upon the taxpayer "an enforceable estate, encumbrance or
interest in an object or thing. . . . But the right created here was simply one
to perform a service, that of an agent to sell his principal's interest in personal
property, i.e., the coal which ... [the mine owner] produced, which carries with
it no interest in either the coal or the mine." Id. at 857-58; of. Weyerhaeuser
S.S. Co. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
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ages and not by injunction or specific performance, that interest
then ultimately consists of a right to share proceeds and not to
dispose of property.
The technique of fragmentation utilized in Ferreris itself noteworthy and is rather original for cases of this sort, though as with
everything in this skillfully devised opinion it has an air of likelihood and plausibility. But was it truly appropriate to consider
and analyze each of the taxpayer's contract rights as a separate
unit, instead of treating the contract, as the Tax Court had, as
one single economic interest? Suppose, to use the court's leasehold
analogy, that a lessee is entitled to occupy certain premises for a
term of years. The lease provides for a stated annual rental, but
provides also that this stated rental is to be reduced by payment
to the lessee of a percentage of the rents received by the lessor
from other tenants in the same building. In exchange for a lump
sum, the lessee now surrenders his entire leasehold interest, including his right to rent reduction payments. It seems quite clear
that such a transaction would produce capital gain. There might
be doubt about the result if the lessee sold off the right to percentage payments by itself and retained the lease, but where the
leasehold is disposed of as well there seems to be no reason to
deny capital gain treatment once it is conceded that a lease is a
capital asset. In Ferrerthe "lessee" retained nothing, and certainly
the right to share in the motion picture proceeds was a part of the
overall lease arrangement, not an independently acquired interest.
It is difficult to see, therefore, why right (3) should have been
carved out of the basic contract and treated as if disposed of for
a separate consideration when that was simply not the case, except
as this procedure may have been necessary to reach the desired
result.
One suspects in the end that this complex decision reflects an
unstated compromise which traces back in some manner to the
issue of personal services. The court in discussing right (3) cited
the Tax Court's earlier decision in Herman Shumlin,74 in which
the producer of a play, entitled under a standard Dramatic Production Contract to share in the proceeds from the sale of motion
picture rights by the playwright, was held to have received ordinary income when, subsequent to a sale of the motion picture, he
agreed to release his right to percentage payments for a fixed sum.
The Tax Court evidently viewed the later transaction as a sale
of accrued personal service income, equivalent to the discounting
of a note received as compensation for services. Presumably the
same view might have been been taken of this aspect of the Ferrer
74. 16 T.C. 407 (1951).
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case, except that the transaction in Ferrerpreceded rather than
followed the rendering of substantial services by the taxpayer. But
the fact that the cancellation of Ferrer's contract preceded the
production of the play seems unimportant to the tax result; in
effect, the reward for services materialized at a very early point in
the history of Ferrer's "career" as a producer, rather than, as the
parties had expected, at a substantially later date. The situation
then somewhat resembles the cancellation of an employment or
service arrangement as in Holt. This characterization of the transaction, under which Ferrer's right to share in the motion picture
proceeds would be viewed simply as an apportionment of the
enhancement in value of LaMure's property resulting from Ferrer's
efforts as a producer (rather than as a feature of the "lease"), tends
to make the court's procedure in requiring an allocation of the
receipt somewhat more intelligible. It is as if (taking a leaf from
Williams v. McGowan") a part of the receipt, presumably the
lesser part, were allocable to Ferrer's entrepreneurial interest in
the play production, the realization of which would have required
some capital outlay, and the balance attributable to a personal
service factor requiring no outlay whatever. Be that as it may, the
court itself said nothing about personal services in this context,
but chose instead to express the result reached in terms of a
distinction based on qualifying property.
To summarize, the status of contract termination payments
under the recent decisions is largely bound up with the conflict
over the meaning of "property" under the Supreme Court's future
income limitation. Halliburton Oil and Dresser Industries conveniently represent opposite points of view. It is just possible to
distinguish these two cases on the ground that the consideration
for the release of the taxpayer's rights in Halliburton Oil was a
share of future royalties payable over the life of the patent and
without limit as to amount, while in DresserIndustries the consideration, though payable out of earnings, was limited to a
maximum figure. The disposition in the former case might therefore be considered as lacking in finality, particularly when viewed
in combination with Halliburton's retained right to use the patent
on a royalty-free basis." Nevertheless, the disagreement between
the decisions seems basic. Absent the element of carved-out interest as respects the particular property disposed of, the Fifth
Circuit (or, at any rate, one panel thereof) perceives no sound
reason for distinguishing between contract rights to earn future
income and other property interests of a concededly capital na75. 152 E.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945).
76. See Cory v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1956).
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ture, such as land or securities.77 The Tenth Circuit, on the other
hand, still representing a majority view in this respect, perceives
no sound reason for distinguishing between present receipt and
future receipt of amounts derived from a single contractual
commitment when the character of the income anticipated is,
admittedly and without question, ordinary.
Deadlocked over the scope of the future income limitation,
Halliburton Oil and Dresser Industries are in a sense balanced
by the Ferrer decision - or both are accepted, or both are rejected, it is hard to say which. Read together, the Tenth and Fifth
Circuit opinions tend to respond to one another in that peculiarly
circular manner which perhaps inevitably characterizes an analysis
that is based upon assumed distinctions between income and capital, fruit and tree. Ferrerthen purports to dissipate the paradox
by treating the issue as if it were actually capable of being solved
in terms of a rule of substantial property, of which the principal
ingredient, surprisingly, is derived from local law remedy concepts.

III. AN EVALUATION OF RELEVANT FACTORS
How shall the relevant authorities be applied by the courts in
deciding whether the termination of a contract right produces
capital gain or ordinary income? As indicated earlier, the sources
of law in this sparsely settled area are, chiefly, a vague statute
containing a somewhat discredited property requirement, a conception (possibly outmoded) of Congress' purpose in establishing
the preference for capital gains, and a twofold limitation on the
scope of the capital asset definition under which substitutes for
future income as well as so-called everyday business profits are
excluded from preferential treatment.
77. One wonders how far the Dresser Industries court is now prepared to
go in -treating future income rights as qualifying property. What, for example,
would have been its decision in the Holt case-the termination payment there
resulting from a decline in the market value of the taxpayer's services and not
from any factor of external property appreciation? The Court in Dresser
Industries indicated that the appropriate discrimination is between a right
to earn income in the future, a capital asset, and a right to collect income
already earned, a non-capital asset until taxed. There is at least an inference,
supported by the same court's decision in Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 807 F.Rd 897 (5th Cir. 1962), and by its disapproval of United
States v. Eidson, 310 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1962), that a like distinction would
be maintained although the right relinquished by the taxpayer should involve
the performance of individual personal services as an employee for a fixed
wage. It may be noted that the court did not find necessary to its decision
the same aspect of business liquidation which appeared to influence the outcome in Nelson Weaver Realty, supra. The absence of capital outlay, stressed

in HalliburtonOil, also was ignored.
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1. Value Appreciation
At the outset one may put aside those cases in which a taxpayer disposes of a right to receive deferred payment for a service
already performed. The status of an earned income claim simply
depends upon its source. If receipt of the claim would have been
ordinary income had the claim been valued and taxed when the
service was completed, a sale of the claim in advance of collection
yields the same tax result; and this is true whether the claim was
fixed in amount or contingent.7 8 The cases that have given difficulty, on the other hand, are those in which the right to future
income is disposed of in advance of performance and yet is found
to have a liquidating value to the payee.
Simply described, the latter situation is one in which A obligates himself to furnish a continuous service (skills, land, patent
rights, etc.) to B for a term of limited duration, while B agrees to
compensate A's service at a fixed dollar rate or at a rate calculated
as a percentage of receipts. The parties thus exchange guarantees
of cost and return based upon supply-demand conditions governing the value of A's service at the time the contract is entered into.
If the market for A's service stays at or near the contract price
throughout the term of the contract, neither party profits solely
by reason of the commitment since each could have obtained an
equivalent result by resorting to the market on a day-to-day basis
had this been practical. If the market for A's service changes, on
the other hand, and if the change is not later washed out by a
swing in the opposite direction, the commitment brings a profit
or windfall return to the party in whose favor the spread between
market and contract price develops. Thus, if the market for A's
service goes down, A will derive profit by selling the service to B
at a price which exceeds the cost of acquiring it from others; if the
market for A's service improves, B profits by acquiring the service
at a cost below the price at which it may be furnished to others.
As long as the contract is performed in accordance with its
terms, neither the Commissioner nor the parties themselves will
be concerned to distinguish between the element of profit (or loss)
resulting from changed market conditions and the element of
wages, interest, or rent returned to the productive factors that
make up the subject matter of the contract. Both elements may
be present in the income realized by the parties, but there is no
78. See Rosen v. United States, 288 F.2d 658 (sd Cir. 1961); Arnfeld v.
United States, 163 F. Supp. 865 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Floyd L. Turner, 38 T.C. 304
(1962); Bessie Lasky, 22 T.C. 13 (1954), petition for review dismissed, 235
F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 1027 (1957); Herman Shumlin, 16 T.C.
407 (1951).
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reason and probably no way to separate one from the other while
the parties continue to meet their contract obligations. However,
if the contract is terminated prior to completion, whether by
voluntary action or by breach, A and B will then be obliged to
take account of the profit or windfall factor in their relationship
by capitalizing the value of the commitment for purposes of liquidation. One would therefore expect the amount of the liquidation
payment to differ substantially from the amount that the payee
would have earned by fully performing the contract. Discounted
for anticipation, this figure would tend to reflect the amount of
positive or negative profit which each party would expect to
realize by completing the contract, over and above the return
available on like commitments in the current market.
Contract termination thus presents an essentially familiar picture: one in which the parties to an existing commitment experience a change in the rate of return to be expected from it, and
elect, for reasons satisfactory to each but doubtless involving a
judgment of the future, to liquidate their bargain. It is difficult to
imagine what else the Supreme Court could have had in mind in
speaking of "situations ... involving the realization of appreciation

in value."7 0
The distinction between "lessor" and "lessee" is sometimes
said to be an important one in this area,s0 presumably by reason
of the taxpayer's lessor status in the Hort case, but on analysis it
appears to have no special bearing on the issue of capital gain or
ordinary income. The lessor derives income from the lease itself,
while the lessee derives income from subleasing the property or
utilizing it in connection with the production of goods or services
for sale to others. But since both parties bind themselves to exchange a designated commodity at a stated price for a period
stretching out into the future, each assumes the same type of
market risk and each will sustain a profit or loss in the event of a
change in the value of the leased premises. The arrangement becomes advantageous to the lessor (employee, lender) when the
cost of furnishing the land (labor, capital) declines; it becomes
advantageous to the lessee (employer, borrower) when the value
of the same commodity goes up. There is no apparent reason why
the surrender of that advantage should not have the same tax
consequence to either party. Abstractly stated, the lessor's status
resembles that of a bondholder entitled to fixed annual interest
payments, whose bond appreciates in dollar value because of a
general decline in the market rate of interest. The bondholder can
79. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp. Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960).
80. See Rev. Rul. 129, 1953-2 Comi. BuLL. 97.
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now, if he desires to replace his original capital, go to the market
for a capital sum equivalent to his bond investment and obtain the same sum at a lower cost than that at which he
has agreed to furnish it to the bond issuer. If, instead, he
elects to dispose of the bond, whether to a third party or
to the issuer, he receives back his original investment plus
an additional amount sufficient to restore a portion of the
loss in earning power occasioned by the drop in interest rates.
The disposition is regarded as gain-producing, and the gain is
regarded as capital. A lessor also supplies capital under an arrangement calling for fixed payments on the lessee's part. If rentals
decline in the market, the lessor's interest appreciates correspondingly. When the lessee buys in the lease, the lessor recovers his
original capital (the leased premises) and receives cash in addition.
Again, the transaction produces taxable gain which is attributable
to a decline in the lessor's cost of furnishing his capital to the
lessee. If this gain qualifies as "value appreciation" in the bondholder case, it ought to do so for the lessor as well.
The above description by and large fits the cases reviewed in
the preceding section, though without reflecting all of their complexity. The Holt, Eidson, Bisbee-Baldwin, and Nelson Weaver
Realty cases seem to involve a taxpayer whose status resembles
that of a lessor (A in the example above), the cost of whose service
has declined since the original contract date. Without requiring
further performance, the taxpayer's lessee or employer (Paramount Pictures in the Holt case) now pays over to the taxpayer,
in liquidation of its commitment, an amount reflecting the difference between the contract price for the taxpayer's service and
the price which the same service commands in the current market;
or in the alternative, a third party, willing to furnish the same
service at a smaller net return, acquires the right to substitute his
performance for that of the taxpayer by payment of a cash consideration. Halliburton Oil, Dresser Industries, Ferrer, and perhaps Ayrton Metals appear to raise the question from the lessee's
standpoint, the value of the leased premises (patent, copyright,
etc.) having substantially increased in value over the contract
term. Here it is the lessor, or as in Ferrer,a third party, who desires to acquire the taxpayer's profitable opportunity by making
payment of the commuted value of the taxpayer's right to future
income less the current cost of performance. In all instances,
viewed from the payor's side, the payment is obviously made not
for performance on the part of the payee, but for a right to substitute the payor's own performance or participation at a lesser net
return than that available to the payee by reason of the contract.
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Viewed from the payee's side, the receipt compensates not for the
performance of a service, but for the relinquishment of an opportunity to earn profits by furnishing that service to the payor at a
cost below the contract price or by acquiring that service from
the payor at a cost below the market.
Considered as involving the sale of an opportunity to profit
rather than a compensated service, the contract termination cases
-

even those arising on the "lessor's" side -

generally do seem to

present an instance of accrued value appreciation within the meaning of Burnet v. Harmeland Gillette Motor Transport.A broad test
of this would be whether the taxpayer possesses an interest which
can be disposed of for a consideration without the further commitment of his own resources, that is, without obligation on the taxpayer's part to perform a further service or to furnish anything
additional in the way of labor or capital. This, of course, is an outstanding circumstance in all of the cases reviewed, so that as respects the presence of value appreciation, the Dresser Industries
decision is no less than accurate. By the same token, to the extent
that such decisions as Holt,Eidson, and Bisbee-Baldivinmay seem
to equate contract liquidation payments with an advance upon future services, they are literally in error. The source of value in these
cases is in the contract commitment itself and in the willingness of
the parties to take the risks of the market for the period agreed
upon. In most instances there is no significant capital investment in
the contract and hence the contract right is usually without a basis;
but while this fact may, as the HalliburtonOil case suggests, have
some bearing on the Code requirement of "property," it has no
apparent consequence for "value." The contract cases thus appear
to conform with the Supreme Court's assumption as to congressional purpose.
2. Future Income
Once the contract cases are seen to contain the requisite element of realized value appreciation, the propriety of applying the
income anticipation doctrine of Hort and Lake becomes very
doubtful unless some long-standing assumptions about these decisions are now to be discarded. It is usually said that the present
value of an asset reflects the discounted sum of the future income
payments expected to be derived from it. Nevertheless, the tax law
"prefers" gains realized upon the occasion of a change in rate of
capitalization over gains realized in the form of periodic income distributions. This preference can be carried out only if enhancement
of property value is sharply distinguished from periodic income. In
general, the distinction is administered by means of a termination
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of interest requirement under which the taxpayer is afforded capital
gain only if he acts so as to create a definitive change in the form
of his holdings. Apart from their disputed application to the contract termination cases, the Hort and Lake decisions have long
been regarded by the tax bar as concerned solely with the need
to apply this latter requirement in the rather unusual case in
which a right to receive income for a limited period is separately
disposed of by the owner of a larger interest in the same property.
In this situation the Supreme Court has held in effect that the
sale of a short-term income interest by the owner of the underlying corpus is to be considered as equivalent to the receipt of
periodic income payments and not as the realization of any change
in property value. The rule, which has an obvious function in preventing the conversion of ordinary investment income into capital
gain by periodic anticipation, is usually explained by comparing
the status of two shareholders owning the same appreciated security, one of whom sells his dividend rights for an advance period,
say five years, while the other retains and exercises his rights in
the normal fashion.s- Assuming no change in the value of the
security, at the end of five years each shareholder will still be the
owner of the same appreciated property, and each will have received five years worth of dividends, though over a different timeperiod. Since both will thus have retained the unrealized gains
inherent in their investments, the amount received by each is
deemed to be income rather than property appreciation. For the
same reason, if the purchaser of the short-term dividend right
should subsequently resell his acquired interest for an amount in
excess of his unamortized cost, the gain would presumably be considered as attributable to property appreciation and not to
periodic income.82
The facts in the Hort case actually differ somewhat from the
illustration just given, but the Court's reasoning, particularly its
view of the basis issue, seems consistent with the theory of the
illustration. In Hort the taxpayer had inherited certain real estate
subject to 15-year lease. Subsequently, when the lease still had
some nine years to run, the taxpayer and his lessee agreed to a cancellation of the lease in consideration for a cash payment by the
lessee, the leased premises having substantially declined in value.
The taxpayer argued for the recognition of a loss on the ground that
his inherited basis for the lease (the commuted value of the unma81. See ALI, DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS

(1960).

IN CAPITAL
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82. See Blair v. Commissioner, 800 U.S. 5 (1937); Rev. Rul. 251, 1951-2

CUM. Burs. 172.
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tured rental payments) exceeded the cash received plus the fair
market value of the leased premises for the remaining nine-year
term. The Court held, however, that the cash payment represented
ordinary gain. The decision contains the observation that "basically the payment was merely a substitute for the rent reserved
in the lease," 3 and this statement, taken by itself, may be said
to indicate that the Court regarded the taxpayer's right to income
payments as lacking in the essential characteristics of a capital
asset. But the result can also be attributed to the taxpayer's
ownership of the underlying fee and to the Court's unwillingness
to consider the taxpayer's inheritance as consisting of two independently valuable properties. Thus, in addition to finding that
the cash payment was ordinary income under the circumstances,
the Court denied the taxpayer a separate basis for the leasehold
and in effect, as in the illustration, reserved the entire change in
capital value to the fee interest.
That the intention in Hort and Lake was merely to affirm that
a sale of income rights unaccompanied by a disposition of the
underlying property is to be treated as a prepayment of rents,
dividends, etc., and not as the realization of capital appreciation,
is indicated by the Court's practice of relying on assignment-ofincome decisions to support an ordinary income result in the former
cases. Thus, Helvering v. Clifford," Helvering v. Horst," and Harrisanv. Schaffner" are cited in Lake, and Horst in Hort. Since they
do not otherwise bear upon the definition of capital asset, the
relevance of these assignment-of-income decisions to the issue of
capital gain must derive from the presence of a termination of
interest requirement in both areas. The Court evidently considers
the requirement as having equivalent effect whether the litigated
issue relates to choice of taxable person or to a choice between
capital gain and ordinary income, and the same parallel application has been stressed by the Commissioner."7
It seems unlikely, therefore, that Hort and Lake, despite broad
language in both, can reasonably be interpreted as holding that
a right to create future income simply fails, by reason of an inherent defect in the property itself, to meet the definitional requirements of section 1221. The customary carved-out interest
reading is far more tenable, particularly as the broader view is
highly susceptible to attack by extension, as in the Dresser
83. 313 U.S. at 31.

84.
85.
86.
87.

309 U.S. 331 (1940).
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
312 U.S. 579 (1941).
See Rev. Rul. 275, 1958-1 Cua. Buu,. 22; Rev. Rul.
BuLL. 172.

251, 1954-2 Cum.
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Industries opinion. One would have to place a limit on such a
broad view in order to avoid the conclusion that a sale of land
or securities also involves a sale of future income rights,"8 and then
limit it still further to prevent its application to a sale of goodwill.
In effect, such an exclusionary principle would have to be confined to intangible interests involving little or no capital outlay
and interests having a limited and predictable useful life. But the
statute contains no such distinctions, and the courts are not
likely to feel authorized to create a detailed set of criteria involving these elements on a case-by-case basis.
In the end, it seems most satisfactory to read the Hort and
Lake decisions in the usual way and to restrict their application
to situations involving a sale of detached income rights by one
retaining a residual interest in the same property. But since this
element of carved-out interest is generally lacking in the contract
termination cases, this line of authority seems rather vulnerable
from the Commissioner's standpoint and may ultimately lead
away from a finding of ordinary income.

3. SubstantialProperty
As an alternative to the future income theory, the Commissioner has also sought to limit capital gain by application of a
property requirement. The courts, too, have sometimes found ordinary income on the ground that the taxpayer's contract rights
lacked the status of property, particularly in cases involving the
cancellation of an agency or employment agreement." The Second
Circuit, moreover, has given special emphasis to the distinction
between substantial and insubstantial property rights in this
context, and traces of the same approach can be found in Halli-

burton Oil.
The Commissioner, although conceding that payment to a
lessee for cancellation of a lease results in capital gain, has stated
that he "will continue to regard the relinquishment of simple contract rights as not involving the sale or exchange of a capital
asset ... and will treat amounts received in consideration of such
relinquishment as constituting ordinary income . . . ."9o Despite

the focus on "relinquishment," it is apparent that the Commissioner now frequently finds ordinary income whether the contract
is released to the other contracting party or is assigned to a third
88. Compare Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th
Cir. 1960), in which the court found capital gain on the sale of a lease having
slightly more than two years to run.
89. See Thurlow E. McFall, 34 B.T.A. 108 (1986).
90. Rev. Rul. 531, 1956-2 CUM. BuL. 983-84.
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party."' He has never stated precisely why he considers simple
contract rights as lacking in the characteristics of a capital asset,
but the explanation may lie in the view either that a contract right
is not a capital asset because it calls for a continuing performance
on the taxpayer's part, or that a contract "is not the sort of property which is susceptible of ownership for a length of time as is a
share of stock, a bond, or a thing."9 2
To the extent that this reasoning seems to equate contract
termination payments with amounts paid as compensation for a
service rendered or to be rendered, it tends to resemble the HortLake future income analysis and is subject to the same objections,
which relate both to the impropriety of extending Hort and Lake
beyond the carved-out interest situation with which those decisions were intended to deal, and to the error made in regarding
contract termination payments as an advance for service rather
than as an instance of realized value appreciation. To the extent
that the Commissioner's approach involves an "ownership" concept, it is simply puzzling. What aspect of ownership is at issue?
Literally, the contract belongs to the taxpayer in the sense that
his rights thereunder cannot legally be terminated. Moreover,
these rights necessarily date from the time that the contract is
entered into; from that point on there is a possibility of gain over
and above the cost of furnishing or acquiring the particular service and likewise an exposure to loss if the commitment turns out
to have been ill-judged, so that the taxpayer is "at risk" from the
outset. The contract is salable in the broad sense; hence it is
"held," and the choice to sell or retain depends upon the same
general and individual considerations that would be expected to
influence the possessor of any income-producing asset. In these
respects the situation sufficiently resembles other kinds of economic venturing, including the possession of "a share of stock,
a bond, or a thing," so that talk of "ownership," without additional explanation, seems fairly artificial.
The Ferrer decision also applies principles of property and
ownership, but with a specific refinement. Thus, the Second Circuit distinguishes between substantial and insubstantial property
rights on the basis of an equitable remedy standard. A mere
claim to damages in the event of breach fails to convey an appropriate sense of possession, it appears, while a right to injunctive
relief imports an interest which resembles direct ownership of the
property constituting the subject matter of the contract. But
91. See Paul Small Artists, Ltd., 37 T.C. 223 (1961).
92. Thurlow E. McEFall, 34 B.T.A. 108, 110; see Rev. Rul. 301, 1958-1
Cum. Bum. 23, 24.
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while the particular outcome in Ferrer has an attractive quality
of compromise, as a test of general application the availability of
injunctive relief seems unlikely to produce defensible results. The
taxpayer in Pittston,for example, seems no less entitled to capital
gain treatment than the taxpayer in Ferrer,and in some respects
the claims of the former are more appealing. As in Ferrer, the
remedy standard also means that state law is to play an important
and perhaps determinative role in defining "property" in these
cases, although the Supreme Court in the Lake case, confronted
with the fact that an oil payment constitutes an "interest in land"
under Texas law, expressly rejected the use of state property concepts for the purpose of capital asset classification.
On analysis, it appears that insofar as a distinction based upon
the availability of an equitable remedy has the effect of creating
a category of non-capital contract rights, it again involves the
assumption that payment for the termination of a contract calling for continued performance on the payee's part is essentially
an advance upon services. Thus, suppose that A desires the cancellation of his contract with B, not because the value of B's service to A has changed in the market, but because A now intends
to devote his own income-producing resource to a wholly different use or to withdraw those resources and dispose of them
for cash. If B is limited to damages in enforcing his contract rights,
A need offer no more for the cancellation of those rights than an
amount reflecting the assumed value of B's damage claim, taking
into account B's duty to mitigate. Where the market value of B's
service remains unchanged, therefore, A would theoretically offer
little or nothing for B's consent to cancellation. On the other hand,
if B is entitled to injunctive relief, he thereby possesses a charge
or restraint upon A's property which he need not release except
for a consideration. A would then be obliged to pay a premium
for his freedom from the contract, just as the issuer of a bond
might be obliged to pay a premium for the right to call the bond
prior to maturity.
It is possible, by manipulation of a property test, to distinguish
between a payment to B for the release of B's restraint upon A's
freedom to dispose of his property, and a payment to B which
reflects the present value of B's performance rights. Thus, the
former can be realized only by disposing of the contract and not
through continued performance; the latter can be realized as well
by performing the contract to completion. The Second Circuit's
stress on injunctive relief may be rationalized as a willingness to
identify the premium or penalty feature with capital gain; when
equitable restraints are lacking, on the other hand, the court re-
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gards the amount received as attributable solely to performance
rights (non-substantial property) and agrees with the Commissioner in finding ordinary income. 3
But whatever substance can be found in an equitable interest
standard, there is again the broader question of why a contract
right, having acquired a liquidating value, should not be regarded
in the same light as a share of stock, a bond, or a thing, whether
or not it qualifies as an equitable interest in property. Thus, if
capital gain extends to the premium received by a bondholder on
the bond's being called prior to maturity, it also extends to the
realization prior to maturity of an increase in the value of the
bond resulting from a decline in interest rates. As noted previously,
the status of a bondholder following a drop in interest rates, and
the status of one committed to a performance obligation following a drop in the cost of his performance, are generally similar in
the sense that each now owns a thing which can be sold at a gain
to someone willing in effect to substitute his own capital or performance for that of the seller. If the performance obligor is given
ordinary income treatment, the bondholder should be treated
in the same fashion; yet all are aware that the bond is a capital
asset. The same is true, as the court apologetically points out in
Ferrer,of a. debenture, than which "it would be hard to think of a
contract more 'naked' . . . yet no one doubts that it is a 'capital

asset' if held by an investor." 4
What has been said in connection with the future income
limitation applies equally to an analysis based upon substantial
and insubstantial property rights. Unless the courts are prepared
to undertake the development of an elaborate set of criteria involving such elements as capital outlay and length of pay-out
period, it is difficult to see how distinctions based on property and
ownership can be maintained with any appearance of logic. The
Supreme Court has stated that the proper object of capital gain
treatment is value appreciation. If that element is lacking, the
presence of property in an abstract sense will not save matters
from the taxpayer's standpoint. It seems as well to apply the
same maxim m reverse and to say that if the element of value
appreciation is present, the concept of property ought not to be
available to the Commissioner as an exclusionary device. The
Court's value premise is, in a sense, a simple and reliable one, and
93. The fragmentation procedure in Ferrer may be stretched to fit this
distinction. The court there required an allocation of the percentage money
between anticipated performance income and the premium (so to speak) paid
for release of the taxpayer's equitable restraints, with the former apparently
expected to absorb the major share of the total.
94. 304 F.2d at 129-30.
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as the cases show by their confusion, there is a good deal to be
said for taking it at face value instead of seeking limitations in
an undefined property requirement.

4. Everyday Business
Once the presence of realized value appreciation is admitted,
as perhaps it ought to be in these cases, the only real question left
for consideration is whether the result for tax purposes is affected
by the business context factor. A notable thing about the Com-

missioner's expressed position in this area is that it seems to
derive so little from the obvious fact that each of the cases discussed above involved business property and business income. Yet
it would appear to be precisely this circumstance that brings on
the Commissioner's deficiency action in the first place. If any of
the foregoing cases had arisen outside the taxpayer's business or
profession - if, for example, an investor had purchased Ferrer's
right to share in the motion picture proceeds and had then resold
that right at a profit - the result would quite clearly have been
capital gain"5 and there is little likelihood that the Commissioner
would contend otherwise at the present time. Thus, the Commissioner has held that the sale of bond coupons acquired separately
from the bond produces capital gain;"6 likewise he shows no inclination to relitigate the treatment of life estates. In effect, he now
contests the status of income rights only when the issue comes up
in a business setting. The difficulty is that he does so in terms
broad enough to apply to investment property as well, a point
which the courts in Dresser Industries and Ferreremphasized to
his disadvantage.
Finding ordinary income on a sale of corn futures acquired by
a processing company as insurance against an increase in the price
of its basic raw material, the Supreme Court in Corn Products"
explained its holding with another reference to congressional
intent:
Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the everyday
operation of a business be considered as ordinary income or loss rather
than capital gain or loss. The preferential treatment provided by § 117 applies to transactions in property which are not the normal source of
business income.98
95. See Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 (1955); Pacific Finance Corp., 19 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 419 (1958).
96. Rev. Rul. 251, 1954-2 Cum. B=L. 172.
97. 350 U.. 46 (1955).
98. Id. at 52.
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The Court has not found an opportunity in the ten years since
Com Products was decided to expand upon the meaning of this
language. While the general rule of construction for which the
decision is best known has become axiomatic in capital gain law,
there is uncertainty as to how the Corn Products doctrine works
in the area to which it specifically applies, that is, the treatment
of business property which is not real or depreciable within section 1231. In addition to business contracts, this miscellaneous or
residual category may include securities, commodities futures,
goodwill, and presumably other business interests not presently
identifiable. The classification of business contracts can thus be
generalized as a problem of how to treat any business property
not squarely within the stock-in-trade exception and not a section
1231 asset.
The interpretative possibilities arising out of the Corn Products
decision are usually said to be twofold: first, a restrictive interpretation under which the Corn Productsdoctrine would apply only
to business property which can reasonably be assimilated to
stock in trade; and second, a broader view under which the doctrine would be extended to cover most or all business property
which is not real or depreciable. 9 So stated, the issue in effect is
whether the quoted language was merely in aid of an expanded
construction of the stock-in-trade exclusion, or whether something more was intended.
The Commissioner's approach to Com Productshas been rather
circumspect, but on the whole he seems to adopt the narrower
stock-in-trade interpretation.o0 0 Published rulings dealing with
the specific application of the Corn Productsdoctrine have mostly
been concerned with the treatment of gain or loss on the sale of
stock, bonds, or other securities purchased as a means of obtaining
99. See ALI, op. cit. supra note 81, at 354; Freeman, Is There a New Concept of a Business Asset?, 86 TAXES 110 (1958).
100. Thus, Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(a) (1957) states simply: "The term
'capital assets' includes all classes of property not specifically excluded by section 1221." The Commissioner has utilized Com Products in resolving doubts
about the scope of the stock in trade exclusion. See Rev. Rul. 141, 1962-2
Cum. BulL. 182 (motion picture and television films produced with a view to
outright sale following an initial period of leasing held within the class of
stock in trade). He has also attempted to apply Corn Products in cases involving property sold along with business inventory or acquired as a byproduct of ordinary business activity. See Rev. Rul. 77, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL.
118 (deposits on depreciable containers used by taxpayer in shipping its products and forfeited by customers on failure to return them). But the courts
have not been especially receptive to the creation of a category of ordinary
by-products income. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours v. United States, 288 F.2d
904 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (rejecting Rev. Rul. 77, supra); Ralph H. Peters, 87 T.C.
799 (1962); McCullough Transfer Co., 27 T.C. 822 (1957).
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needed business property such as inventory.'o' It is reasonably
plain in these cases that the securities are regarded by the taxpayer not as an investment in the usual sense but as a necessary
business expenditure. Ultimately, the taxpayer's business needs
having been met (or thwarted), the securities are disposed of or
become worthless. In this situation the Service has ruled that ordinary gain or loss results if "the objectives for which the stock or
securities are purchased are such as may be accomplished and the
stock or securities disposed of within a relatively short time after
their acquisition."10 2 Securities entitling the taxpayer to obtain "a
specific amount of . . . inventory within a specified time,"'03 or
enabling the taxpayer to overcome a "temporary" inventory shortage by acquiring a specific proportion of a supplier's output, are
thus viewed as ordinary. On the other hand, securities purchased
in order to meet a long-term business need - one that is not associated with a particular transaction or with a temporary condition
- are evidently regarded as capital assets despite the absence of
a non-business "investment" motive. The dividing line, of course,
is not known. Clearly enough, however, the Service will resist
ordinary loss treatment where the underlying business arrangement is subject to no fixed termination date,' 4 or where the securities represent control of the issuer.xo'5 Presumably, ordinary
treatment is permitted only if, at the time the securities are
purchased, the end of their usefulness in the taxpayer's business is
well in view. Although these rulings are expressed in terms of gains
as well as losses, it seems apparent that the Service is principally
concerned with the loss side of the situation, and indeed almost
all of the business-related securities cases decided by the courts
to date have involved claims of ordinary loss. 0
101. See Rev. Rul. 41, 1958-1 Cus. BuL. 86; Rev. Rul. 40, 1958-1 Cum.
BurL. 275; cf. Rev. Rul. 18, 1961-1 Cui. BuLL. 5.
102. Rev. Rul. 40, 195S-1 Cum. BuLL. 276.
103. Rev. Rul. 40, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 275.
104. See Rev. Rul. 44, 1963-1 Cum. BurL. 11, acquiescing in Ancel Greene
& Co., 38 T.C. 125 (1962). A previous ruling, Rev. Rul. 41, 1958-1 Cumt. BuLL.
86, finding capital loss in the sale by the taxpayer, a mortgage company, of
stock in the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), acquired as a
condition of selling mortgages to the Association, was rejected in McMillan
Mortgage Co., 36 T.C. 924 (1961), acquiesced in result, 1963-1 Cuni. BuLL. 4.
Section 162 of the Code now permits the cost of FNMA stock in excess of its
value at the issue date to be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business
expense.
105. See Electrical Fittings Corp., 33 T.C. 1026, 1031 (1960).
106. The issuer of securities under a tie-in purchase arrangement has ordinary income to the extent of the difference between the issue price and the
investment value of the securities. Rev. Rul. 18, 1961-1 Cuml. Bum. 5. See
also Aircraft Mechanics, Inc., 30 T.C. 1227 (1958).
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Despite the Commissioner's position, taxpayers have enjoyed
remarkable success in persuading the courts to permit these securities losses to be deducted in full, even when the tied-in business
arrangement was of a long-term variety. In Booth Newspapers,
Inc. v. United States,'07 for example, the taxpayers, newspaper
publishers, acquired all the stock of a paper mill company in order
to assure themselves an adequate supply of newsprint during a
period of shortage. Subsequently, when the shortage eased and
newsprint became available from regular sources of supply, the
taxpayers disposed of their paper mill stock at a substantial loss.
The Commissioner contended that the taxpayers, having acquired
a manufacturing subsidiary and having held the same for almost
seven years, should be limited to a capital loss deduction on selling it. But the Court of Claims, stressing the taxpayer's urgent
need for newsprint, found the loss to be part of the cost of obtaining vital inventory and permitted a full ordinary deduction. The
court reasoned that the paper mill stock had been purchased not
as an investment but "as an integral and necessary act" in the
conduct of the taxpayers' business and concluded that the loss
was within the scope of the Corn Products doctrine.s08 The Tax
Court has reached a similar result in a number of decisions, notably Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co. 09 in which full deduction was
allowed for a loss on the sale of debentures of a supplier corporation acquired by the taxpayer as a means of obtaining a dependable source of supply. The Commissioner has indicated his
disagreement with the reasoning in Tulane Hardwood,10 though
it appears at present that as respects inventory supply situations
his litigating efforts may be confined to cases involving the securi107. 803 F.ad 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
108. To the same effect see Journal Co. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 484
(E.D. Wisc. 1961); Smith & Welton v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.
Va. 1958). See also Byerlite Corp. v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1960).
Loss on securities purchased to obtain a sales outlet or to retain the good will
of an important customer has also been held ordinary. John J. Grier Co. v.
United States, 828 Fd 168 (7th Cir. 1964); Hagan v. United States, 21 F.
Supp. 248 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
109. 24 T.C. 1146 (1955). See also Weather-Seal, Inc., 2 CCH Tax Ot.
Mem. 471 (1968); Electrical Fittings Corp., 83 T.C. 1026 (1960); Helen M.
Livesley, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 183 (1960); Arlington Bowling Corp., 18
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 896 (1959).
110. 1958-1 CmiT. Buzz,. 6 n.11. The Commissioner apparently still places
reliance on Exposition Souvenir Corp. v. Commissioner, 163 Fad 283 (2d Cir.
1947), and Logan &Kanawha Coal Co., 5 T.C. 1298 (1945). See Rev. Rul. 41,
1958-1 CUM. BEmL. 86; Rev. Rul. 40, 1958-1 Cum. Bur. 275. Both decisions
would appear to be in doubtful status at present, however. See Commissioner
v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 921 Fd 944 (2d Cir. 1955); Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146 (1955).
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ties of a subsidiary and to cases involving securities held "too
long," i.e., beyond the point at which the tie-in purchase function
continues to have importance.-"
The implications of decisions like Booth Newspapers and Tulane
Hardwoodfor the classification problem presented by section 1221
are not entirely clear. The stock-in-trade exclusion can hardly be
extended to apply to a long-term supply arrangement, and the
courts generally make no effort to treat the securities themselves
as an inventory substitute. On the other hand, some of the decisions do indicate that the courts considered the securities as noncapital assets by reason of the taxpayer's business purpose in
acquiring them, and that ordinary loss treatment is actually the
result of a classification of the property under section 1921. Thus,
the Tax Court, in a situation resembling that in Booth Newspapers, has stated that "stock purchased in the ordinary course
of business . .. is not a capital asset, and the loss upon its sale is

deductible from ordinary income.""' Elsewhere, however, the
court has noted that the problem of business-related securities
may be resolved in favor of ordinary loss "without specific consideration of the capital gains and loss provisions,"He that is,
presumably, by regarding the loss as allocable to the unrecovered
cost of acquiring a valuable business relationship and permitting
it to be deducted as an ordinary business expense or as an ordinary loss when that relationship is terminated. The matter of
precise characterization is not especially important where a loss is
present, since the end result is not greatly affected by whether
the loss is reflected as cost of goods sold, as a business expense
under section 162, or as an ordinary loss under section 165.11
Although the two are not usually considered together, the contract termination and the business-related securities cases quite
obviously have elements in common; indeed, the one would seem
to be the obverse of the other." 5 Thus, both involve the termination of a previously acquired business opportunity, frequently a
contract right. In Tulane Hardwood, the debenture purchase
was tied in with a five-year supply contract. To the extent that
111. Missisquoi Corp., 37 T.C. 791 (1962); Gulftex Drug Co., 29 T.C. 118
(1957), af'd per ouriam, 261 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1958).
112. Electrical Fittings Corp., 3 T.C. 1026, 1031 (1960).
113. Missisquoi Corp., 37 T.C. 791, 796 (1962).
114. See Huston, Tie-In Sales: Treatment of Loss on Resale of Property
Purchasedfor the Purpose of Obtaining Other Property, 10 TAx L. REV. 145

(1954).
115. But see Mansfield Journal Co. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 284 (6th
Cir. 1960), finding ordinary income on the sale of rights under a newsprint
supply contract, the court placing principal reliance on the "everyday business" language of Corn Products.
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the cost of the debentures exceeded their true investment value,
the taxpayer was simply prepaying a portion of the cost of the
merchandise to which it was entitled from the issuer. The Pittston
case, which also involved an integrated loan-supply contract
arrangement, would appear to differ from Tulane Hardwood
chiefly in the respect that the contract turned out to be valuable
instead of worthless. The Commissioner, nevertheless, has argued
the two situations in different terms. In the contract cases he has
opposed capital gain treatment by contending for a broad construction of the Hort and Lake decisions; in the securities cases
he has opposed ordinary loss treatment by pressing for a narrow
application of the Corn Productsdoctrine. In effect, the Commissioner has sought an ordinary gain-capital loss rule for cases
involving the disposition of a business relationship, while taxpayers, with rather more success on the whole, have sought the
opposite pattern.
A capital gain-ordinary loss pattern (that is, a combination of

Dresser Industries and Booth Newspapers), if one should emerge,
would suggest that business contracts and arrangements, and perhaps other non-depreciable business personalty such as stock
exchange seats,1 " had come to achieve a status resembling that of
section 1931 property. Such a development would be wholly accidental, however; there is no indication that Congress intended a
section 1231 pattern to apply more generally than it does. On the
other hand, the business related securities cases provide some evidence that nondepreciable personal property which plays a role
in the everyday operation of a business enterprise may be regarded
as ordinary despite the structure of the capital asset definition. In
addition, there is the point that although the property at issue in
Corn Products could readily have been assimilated to inventory,
the Supreme Court chose to decide the case in a manner that suggests it was responding to a problem of broader dimension than
the limited question of whether securities or commodities futures
can be brought within the stock-in-trade exclusion.
If nothing else, posing the contract termination problem as one
relating to the classification of business income takes the issue
out of the Hort-Lake framework and focuses attention on the one
116. Compare Samuel Cummins, 19 T.C. 246 (1952). The taxpayer, engaged

in the business of buying and selling commodities, sustained a loss on the sale
of a seat on the New York Produce Exchange. The Tax Court found a capital
loss on the ground that the seat, though admittedly business property, was
neither stock in trade, nor real property, nor (since not definitely limited in
duration) depreciable property. The court's subsequent decisions in the cases
cited in note 109 supra, suggest that the

sult in ordinary loss.

Cummins situation might now re-
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element which differentiates these business contract cases from
those involving investment property such as life estates. The conflict among the cases can better and more simply be understood in
business asset classification terms than in terms of the customary
fruit-and-tree analysis. Thus, Dresser Industriesmay be explained
as an attempt to assimilate the termination of a business contract
to a sale of goodwill, the capital asset status of which is presumably beyond question. 1 7 Halliburton Oil, on the other hand,
would appear to treat termination payments as if attributable to
the sale of stock in trade or services. Ferrer,again occupying the
middle ground, reflects an effort to formulate a distinction between a sale of underlying productive facilities and a sale of end
products or services on the basis of a concept of substantial property, thus in effect assimilating some kinds of nondepreciable business interests to section 1231 property. Again, this latter effort
possesses an attractive quality of compromise, though one may
question the relevance of an injunctive relief standard which is
nowhere found or implied in the statute.
In singling out certain productive facilities for capital gain
treatment under section 1931, Congress has adopted a standard
of depreciability as respects the status of personal property used
in business. Presumably, property is depreciable if its acquisition
117. Normally, however, a sale of goodwill requires a sale of the taxpayer's
entire business, so that a transaction involving less than a disposition of the
total enterprise would not appear to qualify as such. See Dodge Bros. v. United
States, 118 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1941); of. Henry Maddock, 16 T.C. 324 (1951).
Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962), indicates that the court may have been influenced in finding capital gain by the
fact that the contract termination was equivalent to a termination of a major
feature of the taxpayer's business-a partial liquidation, so to speak. The
same consideration was not present in DresserIndustries,however, and, though
present, was not deemed significant in cases like United States v. Eidson, 310
F.d 111 (5th Cir. 1962) and United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.
1962).
The sale of a contract incident to a sale of the business as a whole would
seem to sufficiently resemble a transfer of goodwill to justify capital gain treatment, provided that the business involved a significant element of public
patronage and was not merely an employment activity. Masquelette's Estate
v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956). On the other hand, the sale
of a right to profit, particularly a right of limited duration, by an ongoing
business enterprise involves no goodwill transfer and presents instead the
question whether the contract right itself is a capital asset. A distinction based
on business liquidation would appear to be a defensible one and it is not
inconceivable that such a distinction might derive from the Supreme Court's
"everyday business" language in Corn Products.So viewed, the Corn Products
decision would be of a piece with Hort and Lake in the sense that it, too,
would involve an application of the termination of interest requirement found
in the latter cases.
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involves some capital outlay on the taxpayer's part and if the
property is of limited duration in the taxpayer's business. Business
contracts involving no initial acquisition cost to the taxpayer
would therefore generally seem to lack the quality of depreciability
for purposes of section 1231.118 The implication may be that such
property, being nondepreciable, also lacks an essential characteristic of a business capital asset. Admittedly, a contrary implication
is also available, though largely by reason of the failure of the
Code to create a completed classification system for business
property. The choice, at all events, is reasonably straightforward
and lies between a narrower and a broader conception of the application of the capital gains tax in a business setting.
CONCLUSION
The outlook for uniform tax treatment of contract cancellation
payments seems dim at present. While the older cases, like the
118. The courts, busy with questions of property and income anticipation,
have given little consideration to whether business contracts belong in the
category of depreciable property used in the trade or business, although taxpayers have sometimes contended for section 1231 treatment in the alternative.
United States v. Dresser Industries, 324 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963). In Rev. Rul.
4, 1960-1 Cum. Bua. 303, the Commissioner held that a leasehold which, at
the time of its sale, had more than 30 years to run constituted real property,
and if used in the seller's business, constituted a section 1231 asset. Presumably a lease for less than 30 years is regarded by the Commissioner as a
capital asset under section 1291 and not as section 1231 property. See Rev. Rul.
531, 1956-2 CUM. BuL. 983. But see Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner,
282 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1960) (treating leasehold having 10 months to run as
section 1281 property); Marc D. Leh, 27 T.C. 892 (1957), aff'd, 260 F.2d 489
(9th Cir. 1958) (short-term supply contract might be section 1281 property,
but finding no sale or exchange). See also Rev. Rul. 374, 1955-1 Cum. Bua.
870, finding in the circumstances that a distributorship was a capital asset
under section 121.
While an intangible, such as a leasehold, may presumably qualify as
"depreciable" property if its acquisition involves some cost to the taxpayer,
Tom S. Baker III, 38 T.C. 9, 14 (1962), the application of section 1231 to the
contract termination cases reviewed above seems unlikely. Generally, these
contract arrangements require no capital outlay, prepayment of rents or fees or
other initial acquisition costs, but instead involve a continuing forward exchange between the parties. The costs of performance on each side are incurred
periodically and are deductible when incurred. The taxpayer almost invariably
has a zero basis for his contract rights. Wiseman v. Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co., 301 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1962). Contract rights acquired at
no cost would not properly appear on the taxpayer's books as an asset. FnWEY
& MLLn, PRINCIPrs OF AccoUNTING: INTRODUCTORY 201, 215 (6th ed. 1963).
See Aircraft Mechanics, Inc., 30 T.C. 1927 (1958). Depreciability for purposes
of sections 167 and 1231 would seem at least to require that there have been
an initial investment in the contract and hence something to exhaust. Great
Western Fuel Co., 8 B.T.A. 9, 12 (1927).

44

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1

more recent ones, were essentially inconsistent, they did at least
largely confine capital gain to real estate lease cancellations,
so that the decisions were superficially reconcilable by reference to the subject matter of the contract terminated. The Ferrer
and Dresser Industries decisions have altered this by extending
capital gain treatment to non-real estate transactions; likewise,
the Nelson Weaver Realty and Dresser Industries decisions are
bluntly in conflict with other recent decisions within and without
the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, is pretty
clearly not of a mind to grant review in these cases,1 9 although the
general issue seems not unimportant from the standpoint of the
need for consistent administration of the capital gains tax. As respects legislative action, Congress in 1954 took a tentative step
in this area by "supplying" the requirement of sale or exchange
for certain leasehold and distributorship transactions, but it
obviously did not intend thereby to provide any overall solutions,
and there is even doubt whether it intended to suggest a direction
or trend in attitude. The prospect for further legislation of a character sufficiently refined to deal with the status of contract termination payments is exceedingly remote. Yet the cases have begun
to multiply.
As suggested, the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals, with
the exceptions of Dresser Industries, Jones v. Corbyn,12 0 and perhaps Commissioner v. Gof,'2' are generally based upon considerations of a highly artificial character, though in this respect they
merely reflect the position taken by the Commissioner himself.
On analysis, it appears that the termination of a contract interest
does involve the realization of an increment in property value, and
in this respect the situation matches up with the Supreme Court's
reiterated assumption concerning the congressional purpose in
establishing a preference for capital gain. This is true, moreover,
without regard to the specific subject matter of the contract, and
likewise, without regard to whether the taxpayer happens to
occupy the status of "lessor" or "lessee" in the particular case at
issue. Restrictions based on a conception of anticipated future income or on a requirement of property ownership are subject to
119. For example, the following cases would appear to shave
promising opportunity for review: Pittston Co. v. Commissioner,
844 (9d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919 (1958); Commissioner v.
Red 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954); Commissioner
sky, 200 F.2d 72 (Sd Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 845 U.S. 989 (1953).
Judge Raum's remarks in Marc D. Lek, supra note 118, at 898.
120. 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950).
121. 212 F.2d 875 (Sd Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954).

offered a
252 F.2d
Goff, 210
v. GolonConsider
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criticism on two counts: first, they are unsupported by the Court's
landmark capital gain decisions, and in the case of the property
restriction they may even be in conflict with the Court's general
approach in construing section 1221; second, taken literally, both
restrictions go too far in limiting the definition of capital asset, or
to put the matter otherwise, neither can logically be confined to
contract termination transactions without a detailed legislative
effort aimed at furnishing the requisite criteria. Viewed solely in
terms of its economic structure and apart from the business context in which the situation often arises, the prototypical contract
termination case exhibits the essential characteristics of a capital
gain -

realization and value increment - and hence the position

expressed in Dresser Industries seems quite correct in abstract.
On the other hand, the propriety of a broad capital gain rule
for all business contract terminations seems doubtful. What is
involved, after all, is business profits, that is, profits attributable
to a systematic activity normally conceived of as the prime
generating source of income taxable at ordinary rates. The difficulty is that the capital gains tax does not in terms distinguish
between business and non-business activities. Instead, the statute
in effect divides business property into three categories: (1) stock
in trade and property closely related thereto, (2) section 1231
assets, and (3) other property, including goodwill and other intangible interests such as contract arrangements. Property in the
first two categories is dealt with by specific statutory designation:
it is ordinary or capital, as the case may be, whether disposed of
separately or as part of an overall liquidation of the taxpayer's
business. Property in the third category is in a doubtful status,
although the structure of the statute seems to point towards
capital asset treatment. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's
decision in Corn Products may be taken as authority to treat
some if not all of the property interests in this residual category as
ordinary. Moreover, the business-related securities cases suggest
that some courts, in some circumstances, are willing to assume
that this was precisely the Court's intention.
In the end, the contract termination cases present the question
of how business assets should be classified in the absence of an
express designation by the statute. Neither the courts nor the
Commissioner have yet considered the matter in this way, having
devoted themselves for the most part to a manipulation of the
"property" requirement. It seems clear that the latter procedure is
responsible for the present state of judicial conflict in this area; it
may also be that conflict would appear whatever the prevailing
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analysis. What is fundamentally at issue, however, is the role of
capital gain in business. Putting aside tactical considerations,
therefore, the development of meaningful legal argument seems to
require that the issue be considered in terms of the reach of the
Corn Products decision and its impact upon enterprise profits in
general.

